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ABSTRACT 
This article is concerned with strategic challenges facing firms in the 
economy that has experienced a dramatic shift in its institutional 
environment. As a research setting, this article chose Korea since Korea 
has experienced significant changes in its institutional context for the 
last decade. This article suggests that the effectiveness of a firm's 
strategy depends on how effective the strategy is in building resources 
and capabilities (R&Cs) that are critically important to its businesses, 
which are in turn determined by the institutional context. Therefore, 
the institutional context determines the effectiveness of a particular 
strategy by specifying the types of R&Cs. 
This article provides evidence that prior to the late-1980s, most 
strategies for building general R&Cs, such as  government support, 
financial resources, managerial resources and capabilities to secure 
those resources, were highly effective. However, strategies for building 
more industry-specific R&Cs, such as technologies and marketing 
capabilities, were not so critical. This article also anticipated that due to 
the changes in the institutional context, strategies for developing the 
general R&Cs are not so crucial after the mid-1990s whereas strategies 
for developing the industry-specific R&Cs are. Contrary to what was 
initially predicted, however, the results of this article showed that 
strategies both for the general R&Cs and industry-specific R&Cs were 
effective after the mid-1990s. Some implications of this study are also 
discussed. 
The  ques t i on  of why  f i rms  i n  a coun t ry  follow different  
strategies than  do firms in other countries ha s  been one of the 
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focal issues to institutional economists (e.g., Davis & North, 
1971; North, 198 1, 1990) as well as to researchers in the field of 
strategic management (e.g., Khanna & Palepu, 1997; Peng & 
Heath, 1996). This issue has been also attracting significant 
attention from both managers and policy makers in emerging 
markets, since firms in those markets currently face heightened 
pressure to adopt Western business practices, particularly 
Anglo-Saxon practices (Khanna & Palepu, 1997). 
By integrating institutional arguments (Davis & North, 1971; 
North, 1981, 1990) and the resource-based view of the firm 
(Penrose, 1959; Wernerfelt, 1984), this article suggests that the 
effectiveness of a particular strategy depends on how effective 
the strategy is in building critically important resources and 
capabilities that are determined by the institutional context.. 
Therefore, the institutional context determines the effectiveness 
of strategies by specifying the types of resources and capabilities 
that are critically required in the given context. 
As a research setting, this article selects Korea in the mid- 
1980s and mid- 1990s for several reasons. First, the institutional 
settings of Korea have dramatically changed between the two 
periods. Prior to the late 1980s, the institutional settings of 
Korea revealed considerable differences from those of Western 
economies. Since the late 1980s, however, many of the 
institutional settings have drastically shifted toward more 
westernized ones while some of them still remain unchanged. 
Korea is thus an excellent research setting to examine the 
relationships between institutions and firm strategies, which 
may vary through time as well as cross-sectionally in different 
economies (North, 1990). Specifically, this article uses as a 
research setting Korea prior to the late 1980s, which provides an 
institutional context that is quite different from that of Western 
economies, to examine whether the appropriate strategies in the 
institutional context are different from those in Western 
economies. This article also explores whether those strategies 
are still valid in the vastly different institutional context of Korea 
in the late 1990s. 
Second, Korea's phenomenal economic performance prior to 
the mid-1990s and the recent severe downturn of i ts  
performance have attracted considerable attention from scholars 
and managers worldwide to those factors that contributed to its 
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past success and recent crisis. By examining the fit between the 
institutional context and the dominant business practices prior 
to and after the late 1980s, this article attempts to explain the 
past success and current crisis by Korean firms. 
Based on the brief overview of the relevant theories, this article 
first constructs its theoretical framework. By applying the 
framework to Korean settings, this article then develops specific 
hypotheses about the relationships between institutions and 
appropriate strategies in Korea. Specifically, this paper explores 
the  following three questions. First,  why were dominant 
strategies by Korean firms so successful in the institutional 
context prior to the late 1980s, a period characterized by strong 
government and imperfect capital and labor markets? Second, 
are the strategies still effective in the new, changing institutional 
context? Finally, what are the strategic challenges facing Korean 
firms in the  changing inst i tut ional  context? To tes t  the  
hypotheses, this article uses a sample of 279 firms in 1986 and 
583  firms in 1996 tha t  were listed on the  Korean Stock 
Exchange. The conclusion section discusses the implications of 
this study and suggests future research directions. 
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
As a model of how firms compete, which is unique to the field 
of strategic management, the resource-based view places high 
emphasis on the role of a firm's resources and capabilities 
(R&Cs)l) a s  the principle basis for strategy and the primary 
determinants of firm success. The resource-based view perceives 
a firm as  a unique bundle of heterogeneous R&Cs. These R&Cs 
are the basis upon which the firm's competitive advantage is 
built. Whereas many researchers in the resource-based view 
have paid attention to strategies for exploiting existing R&Cs, 
others stress the importance of strategies for developing new 
R&Cs (Dierickx & Cool, 1989; Penrose, 1959; Teece, 1980; 
Wernerfelt, 1984). Firm strategies are thus a dynamic process 
1) Whereas "resources" refer to transferable input factors controlled by the 
firm, that  are converted into outputs (Amit & Schoemaker, 1990), 
"capabilities" indicate a firm's capacity for undertaking a particular activity, 
which is formed as the cooperation of teams of resources (Grant, 1995). 
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both of utilizing existing R&Cs and of developing new ones 
(Teece, Pisano, & Shuen, 1997). In the resource-based view, the 
effectiveness of firm strategies depends on how successfully 
strategies build and utilize R&Cs that are valuable and difficult- 
to-imitate by competitors (Wernerfelt, 1984). 
Whereas institutional theorv has its roots in sociology 
(DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Meyer & Rowan, 1977; Powell, 1988 
& 1991) as well as in economics (Scott, 1987 & 1992; North, 
1990), both approaches to institutionalism are complementary 
to each other (Scott & Meyer, 1991; Peng & Heath, 1996). North 
(1990), representing a n  institutional perspective from 
economics, argues that institutions set the rules of the game in 
a society, which regulate the interactions of individual players, 
both individuals and organizations (e.g., firms). Institutions 
affect the actions of organizations by determining and signaling 
which actions by those organizations are acceptable and 
supportable within a given institutional context (Aldrich & Fiol, 
1994; Hillman & Keim, 1995). By doing so, institutions provide 
the rules of the game in which organizations act and compete 
(North, 1990; Peng & Heath, 1996). As the humanly devised 
constraints that shape the interactions of players, these rules 
include both formal and informal constraints. Formal 
constraints include legal, political and economic rules and 
contracts that human beings devise. Informal constraints 
include conventions and codes of behavior, which are embedded 
in the culture and ideology. As the rules of the game, the formal 
and informal constraints together define the way the game is 
played. The objective of a firm, as a player of the game, is to win 
the game within the set of rules. 
This article proposes that institutions determine and signal 
which actions or strategies are appropriate, in part ,  by 
specifying the types of R&Cs that are valuable and difficult-to- 
imitate by competitors within a given institutional context. The 
resource-based view of the firm suggests firm strategies as the 
way of developing new R&Cs as well as of exploiting existing 
ones. The ways of building and exploiting one type of R&Cs are 
different from those of developing and exploiting other types of 
R&Cs. Since different institutional contexts require different 
types of R&Cs, firm strategies vary by the institutional context. 
Given the influence of the institutional context on a firm's 
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strategies, dominant strategies pursued by firms in emerging 
markets should differ from those in Western economies since the 
institutional contexts in both economies reveal considerable 
, differences. 
In the following section, this article describes the institutional 
context of Korea prior to the late 1980s, as one of emerging 
economies, and its business practices, together with the 
dramatic shifts in its institutional context and economic 
implications after the late 1980s. 
INSTITUTIONAL CONTEXT IN KOREA: 
PRIOR TO AND AFTER THE LATE 1980s 
Korea has been one of the most rapidly growing countries in 
the world over the last several decades. To achieve this 
phenomenal economic development, Korean firms, particularly 
Korean chaebols, have made a critical contribution. Global 
expansion by Korean firms was also impressive. Overseas, they 
pushed through Central Asia into Europe, the U.S. ,  Latin 
America, Australia, and even Africa. They spent billions of 
dollars on new plants to crank out semiconductors, VCRs, and 
cars. Then the crisis hit. The Korean economy suddenly faced a 
severe downturn with a collapse in domestic asset markets, 
widespread bank failures, and bankruptcies of a number of 
firms, including large chaebols . Korean companies, burdened 
with $600 billion in debt, have been being forced to scale back 
their empires. In recent dramatic declarations, top managers in 
many Korean firms say that they will focus on core businesses 
and sell off billions in assets to raise cash. 
Why have Korean firms that seemed to be highly competitive 
become such miserable monsters? In order to understand this, 
one should first understand the institutional context 
surrounding Korean firms. 
General Background 
In 1910, Korea lost its independence for the first time in its 
history of over 5,000 years and was occupied by Japan until 
1945. During the Japanese occupation, Koreans could not 
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actively participate in the process of economic development, and 
thus, had little opportunity to build managerial capabilities. 
Capital was highly scarce and the levels of skills and managerial 
know-how were extremely low after the  occupation. 
Furthermore, while some military-related, large-scale industrial 
plants were established in the northern part of the Korean 
peninsula, agriculture was the only industry developed in the 
southern part. 
In 1945, immediately after the Japanese occupation, the 
Korean peninsula was divided into South and North by allied 
occupation. North Korea, with most of the peninsula's mineral 
resources and industrial base, fell under Soviet influence, while 
South Korea, with a large pool of unskilled human resources 
and agricultural resources, fell under U.S. influence. Due to the 
division of the  Korean peninsula ,  Sou th  Korea lost 
complementary resources in North Korea and its economic 
development was thus extremely imbalanced. Furthermore, the 
Korean War between 1950 and 1953 destroyed much of the 
remaining physical and human resources in South Korea. 
During the war, a quarter of the wealth of South Korea was 
destroyed while over a million lives were lost. 
Political and economic instability after the Korean War created 
a vacuum that was seized by increased military power. General 
Chung-Hee Park assumed political power in 1961 through a 
military coup and announced a series of Five-Year Economic 
Development Plans (Please s ee  Appendix A for Five-Year 
Economic Development Plans, 1962-1 991). 
The Japanese occupation and the Korean War left Korea with a 
severe shortage of goods, particularly consumer goods. Due to 
the lack of production facilities, human and financial resources 
after the Korean War, almost every life necessity had to be 
imported from foreign countries, especially in the form of foreign 
aid. While the supply was highly limited in most industries, the 
consumer demand was large and rapidly increasing. Due to the 
demand surplus from the severe, chronic shortage of goods, 
most industries were structurally attractive. The government 
also made most industries more attractive by protecting 
domestic markets against competition from foreign firms. 
Under the business environment of demand surplus, the rule 
of the  game was "who produces more," rather than  "who 
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produces better." Most firms thus made every effort to produce 
the largest possible to meet such a high demand. Regardless of 
the quality of their products, the firms could easily sell their 
products even a t  high margins. The success of a firm was 
determined largely by the quantity of its products, not their 
quality. 
Since the late 1980s, however, the business environments 
have dramatically changed from demand su rp lu s  to 
overcapacity. In order to meet rapidly growing demand, many 
firms have expanded their capacities, together with a number of 
new entrants. In addition, foreign competitors have also entered 
Korean markets since the economic liberalization in the late 
1980s. While the supply has increased, the market growth has 
slowed down. Under the business environment of overcapacity, 
the rule of the game has not been "who produces more," but 
"who produces better." 
Capital markets and Financial Resources 
Financial resources were extremely scarce in Korea due to the 
small amount  of national  capital accumulated after the  
Japanese occupation and the Korean War, the low domestic 
savings rate, and a decline in foreign aid. Furthermore, the stock 
markets in Korea were highly underdeveloped due to the lack of 
supporting institutional mechanisms, such a s  legal protection of 
small shareholders and industries of stockbrokers, analysts, 
merchant  banks ,  e t  cetera.  Without these  suppor t ing 
institutional mechanisms, investors were highly reluctant to put 
their money into companies through the stock market. Due to 
the underdevelopment of the stock market, Korean firms had to 
rely largely on the banking sector for their financial needs. 
Due to the scarcity of financial resources and the financial 
market that  was bank- centered, the government used its 
ownership of the banks as  a method of implementing its Five- 
Year Economic Development Plans. Through the full control of 
scare financial resources, the government exercised enormous 
power over private investment allocation. Through foreign and 
domestic bank loans with low interest rates, for example, the 
government gave preferential t rea tment  to f irms t h a t  
participated in the government-designated strategic industries. 
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Such strategic industries included import substitution 
industries in the early 1960s, export industries in the late 1960s 
and in the early 1970% and heavy and chemical industries in 
the late 1970s. In 1971, for example, the government-controlled 
interest rate for export financing was 6% while the interest rates 
for curb market loans and the inflation rate were 46.4% and 
8.7%, respectively. 
Since the late 1980s, however, financial markets have become 
more efficient due to the denationalization and deregulation of 
the domestic financial sector. In addition, increasing activities of 
foreign financial institutions in Korea due to the liberalization of 
the financial sector have made financial resources much less 
scarce than before. Thus, the criticality of the financial 
resources as R&Cs has been declining since the late 1980s. 
Labor Market and Managerial Resources 
Managerial resources were another crucial resource required 
for a successful business in Korea. Since Koreans played little 
leadership role in the process of economic development during 
the Japanese occupation, managerial resources were scarce in 
Korea. In addition, the social status of a businessman in a 
Confucian society like Korea was traditionally positioned at the 
lowest level among professions. Reflecting the low status of 
businessmen, business schools were not well developed in 
Korea. Whereas the United States has more than 600 business 
schools training thousands of future managers every year 
(Khanna & Palepu, 1997), Korea had 98 universities in 1980, 
only a small number of which had business schools. Thus, high- 
quality managerial resources were scarce in Korea. 
Furthermore, the labor market, particularly for senior 
managers in Korea was inefficient and almost nonexistent. As 
one of the traditional Confucian countries, Korea valued a man 
of high principles. Once people joined an organization, they were 
supposed to share their fate with the company. If not, they were 
treated as men of low principles and low loyalty. Leaving a 
company and joining another was viewed as betrayal to the 
former company. The exclusive nature  of most Korean 
organizations also contributed to the inefficiency of the labor 
market in Korea. Like Japanese firms, Korean firms were also 
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reluctant to recruiting managers from the outside. Koreans had 
historically suffered from outside invasions and thus tended to 
have an antagonistic feeling against outsiders and to be highly 
defensive about their vested rights. Particularly when a n  
outsider joined the company from another firm, the antagonistic 
feeling was higher because the outsider was considered less 
faithful and more selfish. Because the Korean labour market 
was highly inefficient, most managerial resources had to be 
internally developed and internally allocated. 
During the process of economic development over the last 
several decades, firms in Korea have accumulated a large pool of 
managerial resources. Recognizing the considerable contribution 
of private firms to the country's economic development and 
social welfare, furthermore, Koreans began to bestow a much 
higher social status on businessmen than before. Reflecting this 
changes in social perception on the business community, many 
universities have competed to establish business schools to 
produce qualified future managers. In 1998, the total number of 
universities in Korea increased to 156 from 98 in 1980. Most of 
the universities now have business schools, although the 
average size of the schools is still small. 
Together with the larger pool of managerial resources, the 
managerial market in Korea has also been developed, following 
the liberalization of domestic markets for foreign multinational 
companies (MNCs). Foreign MNCs, unlike traditional Korean 
firms, are eager to recruit senior as  well as  junior managers for 
their businesses in Korea, thus helping to create the domestic 
managerial market. As managerial resources become less scarce 
and more mobile, the importance of managerial resources a s  
R&Cs has also been decreasing since the late 1980s. 
The Government 
Government support were also critical to conducting any 
businesses in Korea. The government established the country's 
long-term strategic directions through a series of Five-Year 
Economic Development Plans. To pursue the Plans effectively, 
the government exercised huge power over the Korean economy 
through various regulations and the control over financial 
resources. During the process of economic development, for 
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example, the government targeted key industry sectors and 
granted quasi-monopolistic licenses for entering these industries 
to selected firms. In addition to the monopolistic positions, those 
selected firms enjoyed huge benefits, for example, from favorable 
tax treatment and cheap financial resources. 
Since the late 1980s, the role of the government in economic 
activity has been declining. As the Korean economy became 
large and complex, the government's centralized decision 
making that had been effective in the past was not effective any 
more. The democratization process in the late 1980s further 
weakened the government's power over the economy. In fact, the 
Korean government adopted a number of policies for the 
deregulation and open economy. As a result, the importance of 
the government support a s  critical R&Cs seems to have been 
reduced. 
Industry-Specific R&Cs 
Whereas more industry-specific R&Cs such as  technologies, 
distribution channels and marketing capabilities were also 
required prior to the late 1980s, they were not sophisticated nor 
advanced at  that time. After the Japanese occupation and the 
Korean war, the domestic supply was highly limited in most 
industries while the domestic demand was high and rapidly 
increasing. In Korea a s  a developing country, in addition, 
customers were neither demanding nor sophisticated. Due to the 
huge excess of unsophisticated demand over supply, Korean 
firms were not so much concerned with the quality a s  much a s  
with the quantity of their products. Satisfying the huge and 
unsophisticated demand required not the state-of-the art and 
high-quality industry-specific R&Cs, bu t  the  simple and 
primitive ones that could be easily purchased from the external 
markets or internally developed in a relatively short period of 
time. For example, most Korean firms acquired the technologies 
required for their low-quality products from foreign firms that 
were willing to sell those old technologies. Since distribution 
channels at  that time were small and simple, it did not take long 
either to develop capabilities in managing them. 
While most industry-specific R&Cs required prior to the late 
1980s were easily purchased from the external markets or 
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internally developed in a reasonable period of time, some of 
them were not even valuable. Due to high demand surplus, for 
example, a firm did not need the marketing-related R&Cs that 
are required to create the firm's demand. 
Facing increasing domestic and foreign competition, Korean 
firms now compete not on price, but on quality. They should 
satisfy highly sophisticated and demanding customer needs 
based on more sophisticated and advanced industry-specific 
R&Cs like state-of the -a r t  technologies and  marketing 
capabilities, which cannot be easily purchased from foreign 
countries or internally developed within a reasonable period of 
time. In addition, such R&Cs as  marketing-related ones have 
become highly valuable due to overcapacity, not demand 
surplus, in the economy. Since the industry-specific R&Cs have 
become more valuable and scarce, their importance as  R&Cs 
has been increasing since the late 1980s. 
Prior to the late 1980s, in sum, conventional and general 
R&Cs, e.g., financial resources, managerial resources and 
government support and capabilities to secure those resources 
were critical, whereas more industry-specific R&Cs, e.g., 
technologies and marketing capabilities, were not. Since the late 
1980s, however, the importance of the conventional and general 
R&Cs has been declining, whereas the criticality of the industry- 
specific R&Cs has been increasing. 
STRATEGIES BY KOREAN FIRMS 
Some of the important strategic tools that  were actively 
employed by a Korean firm to build critical R&Cs were internal 
training, the composition of top managers. industrv selection, 
and diversification. 
Internal Training 
Since labor markets, particularly markets for senior managers, 
were highly inefficient and almost nonexistent in old Korea, most 
managerial resources had to be developed internally through the 
recruitment and training of talented people. While the supply 
was highly limited in most industries after the Japanese  
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occupation and Korean War, the demand was large and rapidly 
increasing. Under the external environment of demand surplus, 
firms competed on the quantity of their products, not on their 
quality. The quantity game required a firm to produce highly 
standardized goods in a large scale, which in turn made it 
critical for the firm to minimize the idiosyncrasies and potential 
pathologies of human behavior in the organization. One way to 
minimize the idiosyncrasies and potential pathology of human 
behavior was strong cultural and internal training. Through 
strong cultural and internal training, firms could achieve the 
standardization of their employees, which ensured consistent 
and predictable human behavior and, thus, maximize the 
quantity of their products. 
In the 1990s, however, the situation has  changed 
dramatically. Overcapacity, rather than demand surplus, has 
become the norm in most industries due to significant increases 
not only in domestic supply, but also in global competition from 
the liberalization of domestic markets. In the environment of 
excess capacity, a firm's success tends to be determined largely 
by the quality, not the quantity, of its products. Strong cultural 
and internal training that could maximize the quantity of a 
firm's outputs through the standardization of its employees were 
highly effective prior to the late 1980s, but not any more after 
the late 1980s. 
Hypothesis 1: Prior to the late 1980s, internal training was 
positively related to firm performance. After the mid-1990s, 
however, the relationship does not exist any more. 
Composition of Top Managers 
Prior to the late 1980s when managerial resources were scarce 
and the market for senior managers was not well developed, the 
recruitment and training of talented people was critical to the 
success of a firm. Most firms thus made every effort to recruit 
the best people. For example, the ex-chairman Byung-Chul Lee 
of Samsung, one of the largest Korean chaebols commented that 
"the role of the top manager is to select and train talented men. I 
have spent over 80 percent of my time on recruiting the talented 
men and educating them." It is well known that however tight 
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his schedule was, the Samsung chairman participated in a s  
many as  100,000 interviews for new recruits. 
One job selection criterion was whether the applicant had a 
social network with government bureaucrats, members of the 
National Assembly, and senior officers in financial institutions. 
Network connections were important for securing government 
support and financial resources that were critical prior to the 
late 1980s. In the Korean society, strong personal, informal 
networks were based primarily on common educational and 
regional background. Firms thus competed on recruiting people 
who shared educational and regional background with dominant 
coalitions in the government, National Assembly and financial 
institutions. Firms then trained those people a s  managers so 
that the firms themselves could have strong personal networks 
with the government and financial institutions. Therefore, top 
managers who shared a common educational and regional 
background with dominant coalitions in the government and in 
financial institutions were highly effective prior to the late 
1980s. As the importance of the government support and 
financial resources has been decreasing since the late 1980s, 
however, we may expect that the relationships have become 
weaker in the 1990s. Defining prestigious universities and 
powerful regions a s  those from which most of dominant 
coalitions in the government and financial institutions came, it 
is hypothesized that: 
Hypothesis 2.1: Prior to the late 1980s, a top management 
team from prestigious universities was positively related to firm 
performance. After the mid- 1990s, however, the relationship has 
become weaker. 
Hypothesis 2.2: Prior to the late 1980s, the top management 
team from powerful regions was positively related to firm 
performance. After the mid- 1990s, however, the relationship has 
become weaker. 
Industry Selection 
Another important strategic tool for a Korean firm to build the 
critical R&Cs that were required prior to the late 1980s was 
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industry selection. When a firm engaged in the industry that 
was targeted as  a strategic industry by the government, the firm 
could acquire strong government support, one of the most 
critical resources prior to the late 1980s. The government also 
provided the firm with monopolistic positions in the strategic 
industry by creating regulatory entry barriers to the industry, 
which further enhanced the structural attractiveness of the 
industry. In addition to the monopolistic positions, the firm 
enjoyed large benefits, for example, from favorable tax treatment 
and  cheap financial resources.  Prior to the  late 1980s,  
participating in government-designated strategic industries was 
one of the most important ways of securing critical resources 
(i.e., government supports and financial resources). 
In the  new, changing inst i tut ional  context, however, 
participation in the strategic industries is not so critical since 
the government's power over or its involvement in the economic 
activities and the criticality of financial resources as  R&Cs have 
been declining. Therefore, 
Hypothesis 3: Prior to the late 1980% firms in the industries 
designated as  strategic industries by the government performed 
better than the firms that were not in strategic industries. After 
the mid- 1990s, however, the relationship does not exist any 
more. 
Diversification 
Diversification could contribute to acquiring the resources that 
were critical prior to the late 1980s, in both direct and indirect 
ways. In a direct way, a diversified group company might have 
advantage in securing more financial resources at  lower cost. 
Prior to the late 1980s when the capital market was not well 
developed, most firms relied on bank loans for their financial 
resources. Banks offered more financial loan at a lower interest 
rate to a large and diversified firm than to a smaller and less 
diversified firm, due to the lower bankruptcy risk of the former. 
The large size resulted from active diversification t h u s  
contributed to obtaining cheap and stable financial resources 
from banks in Korea. 
Diversification could indirectly contribute to securing the 
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critical resources by facilitating the recruitment of best people. 
Traditionally, most Koreans favored large and diversified firms 
over smaller firms because large firms were considered more 
secure and prestigious. Diversified group companies thus had 
more advantages over non-diversified ones in attracting people 
who had potential personal and informal networks with the 
government and financial institutions, for example, people from 
the prestigious universities. By facilitating the recruitment of 
people with networks to the  government and  financial 
institutions, diversification enabled firms to secure government 
supports and financial resources that were crucial prior to the 
late 1980s. 
Another indirect way through which diversification could 
contribute to the acquisition of the critical resources was 
through participation in strategic industries designated by the 
government. As discussed, a firm in the strategic industry had 
enjoyed large government support,  such a s  favourable tax 
t rea tment  and  cheap financial resources.  By using 
diversification a s  a deliberate vehicle to enter these strategic 
industr ies,  firms could secure government supports  and 
associated benefits. 
Prior to the late 1980s, thus, diversification was beneficial. 
Since then, diversification has become less beneficial because 
the  importance of the  government support  and financial 
resources as  R&Cs has been decreasing. Therefore, 
Hypothesis 4: Prior to the late 1980s, group-affiliated firms 
performed better than did non-affiliated firms. After the mid- 
1990s, however, the relationship does not exist any more. 
Prior to the late 1980s, whereas more industry-specific R&Cs, 
such as  technologies and marketing capabilities, were not true 
R&Cs, they are in the 1990s. These industry-specific R&Cs are 
built by active investments in R&D and advertising. It is thus 
hypothesized, 
Hypothesis 5: Prior to the late 1980s, R&D and advertising 
intensities were not related to firm performance. After the mid- 
1990s, however, they are positively related to firm performance. 
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METHODS 
The hypotheses presented in this article suggest that the 
effectiveness of any strategic choice made by firms is highly 
institution-specific. That is, the institutional context specifies 
the types of R&Cs that are the most critical in the context, and 
strategies, or the ways of building one type of R&Cs are different 
from those of developing other types of R&Cs. It follows that the 
effectiveness of strategies, as a way of building critical R&Cs, is 
highly institution-specific. Since this article is concerned with 
the variations of the institutional context across time, it needs 
two sets  of data for different time periods, each of which 
represents a different institutional context. In Korea, most 
dramatic institutional changes, including the democratization of 
political systems, the de-nationalization and de-regulation of the 
domestic financial sector, and the liberalization of domestic 
markets, occurred in the late 1980s. This article thus used data 
se t s  for 1986 and 1996,  each representing old and  new 
institutional contexts in Korea, respectively. All firms that were 
listed in the Korean Stock Exchange in 1986 and 1996 were 
used a s  the sample of this study. A total of 279 firms were 
identified in 1986. Of 279 firms, 101 firms were affiliated with 
the 50 largest chaebol groups whereas 178 firms were not 
affiliated with the groups. In the 1996 sample, a total of 583 
firms were used. Of 583 firms, 175 firms were a member of the 
50 largest chaebol groups whereas 408 firms were not affiliated 
with the groups. Each of the variables used in this study was 
measured as  follows. 
Measures 
Dependent variable: firm performance. Firm performance, 
the dependent variable in this research, was measured by 
returns on assets (ROA), defined as net income after taxes but 
before extraordinary items divided by total assets. As recognized 
by other researchers (e.g., Bettis & Hall, 1982; Caves & Uekusa, 
1976; Chang & Choi, 1988; Michel & Hambrick, 1992), returns 
on equity or returns on invested capital would be the correct 
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measure of firm performance if capital markets were efficient. In 
Korea where the debt-equity ratio is high and capital markets 
are still imperfect, ROA is the more accurate measure of firm 
performance. Not only does ROA control for the effects of 
differing financial structure, but is also widely employed by both 
managers and researchers. To control the industry effects, 
industry average ROA was included as  a control variable. 
Independent variables. The independent variables used in 
this research were operationalized as  described below. "Internal 
training" was measured by total training expenses divided by the 
number of employees. Most of those who dominated senior 
positions in the government, National Assembly, and financial 
institutions were people from prestigious universities in Seoul, 
particularly from Seoul National University, Korea University, 
and Yonsei University. Those dominating groups also tended to 
be from the Southeast of the peninsular (i.e., youngnam region), 
who had traditionally an  antagonistic feeling about people from 
the Southwest (i.e., honam region). Prior to the late 1980s, thus, 
top managers from the prestigious universities and from the 
Southeast were highly effective in securing government supports 
and financial resources through their informal, personal 
networks, whereas top managers from the Southwest of the 
peninsular had negative effects. 
Two levels of top managers were examined in this study: the 
chief executive officer (CEO) and the top management team 
(TMT). CEOs from prestigious universities and CEOs from 
powerful regions were measured by dummy variables. If a firm's 
CEO was from Seoul National University, Korea University, or 
Yonsei University, the  variable "CEO from prestigious 
universities" was coded "1." Otherwise, it was coded "0." If the 
CEO was from the Southeast of the peninsula, the variable "CEO 
from powerful regions" was code "1," whereas if the CEO was 
from the Southwest it was coded "-1," reflecting their negative 
effects. Otherwise, it was coded "0." 
A member of TMT was here defined as  the manager above the 
level of managing director. The "proportion of TMT from 
prestigious universities" was thus measured as  the percentage of 
TMT members from Seoul National University, Korea University 
and Yonsei University. The "proportion of TMT from powerful 
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regions" was measured by the difference between the percentage 
of top managers from the Southeast of the peninsular and the 
percentage of top managers from the Southwest. 
"Strategic industries" was measured by a dummy variable. If a 
firm participated in the industries designated a s  strategic 
industries by the government's Five-Year Economic Development 
Plans, the  variable "strategic industries" was coded "1." 
Otherwise, it was coded "0." Group affiliation was also measured 
by a dummy variable. If a firm was affiliated with the 50 largest 
chaebol groups, the variable "group affiliation" was coded "1." 
Otherwise, it was coded "0." "Advertising intensity" and "R&D 
intensity" were measured by total advertising and R&D expenses 
divided by total sales. These measures were then converted into 
industry-relative measures by dividing each firm's advertising 
and R&D intensities by industry average advertising and R&D 
intensities, respectively. 
RESULTS 
Tables 1 and 2 present means, standard deviations, and 
correlations among the variables in 1986 and 1996 samples, 
respectively. One of the most notable differences between the 
1986 and 1996 samples was internal training. The average 
training expenses per employee increased from .04 in 1986 to 
.21 in 1996, reflecting Korean firms' increasing emphasis on 
their employees. Another striking difference between the two 
samples was the  increasing number  of CEOs from the  
prestigious three universities, Seoul National University, Korea 
University, and Yonsei University. The percentage of firms with a 
CEO from the prestigious universities increased from 18% in 
1986 to 39% in 1996. The average percentage of TMT from the 
prestigious universities remained high, but decreased slightly 
from 47% in 1986 to 41% in 1996. 
Tables 1 and 2 also show the correlations among the variables 
in the 1986 and 1996 samples. The results indicate that there 
are no serious multicollinearity problems among independent 
variables. In 1986, as expected, 'CEO from powerful regions' and 
'strategic industries' were positively associated with profitability 
whereas 'advertising intensity' and 'R&D intensity' were not. 
TABLE 1 (1986 SAMPLE) & TABLE 2 (1996 SAMFU3)lJ Means, Standard Desktion, and Correlations 
Variables 
2 
Meanss.d. 1 2  3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 0 
k 
1 .profitability .02 .06 e 
2. Industry profitability .02 .02 .23*** 
5 
2 
3. Internal trainmg .04 .06 .08 .04 % 
4. Proportion of TMT from preswous universities .47 .25 .02 -.01 .15* 2 
.25 .37 -.02 -.06 .08 -.07 
2 
5. Proportion of TMT from powerhl regions 2 
6. CEO from prestigious universities .18 .38 -.05 .05 -.01 .04 -.03 g 
7. CEO from powerhl regions .23 .56 .11+ -.01 .03 -.03 -.04 -.11+ 3 
8. Strategic industries .28 .45 .15** .08 -.lo+ .06 .13* -.12+ -.07 a 
9. Group fiation (50) .38 .49 -.15** -. 19*** .18** .20*** .08 .03 -.07 .OO 2 
10. Advertising intensity 1.80 3.62 .09 .23*** .03 -.17** -.13* .05 -.09 .05 -.16** ;T: 




Variables Meanss.d. 1 2  3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 $ 
B 
1 .Profitability -.01 .07 - = 
2. Industry profitability .OO .01 .25*** -2 
3. Internal tmming .21 .38 .13** .09* r? 
4. Proportion of TMT fkom prestigious universities .41 .29 .OB+ -.02 .11** R 
.25 .40 .08+ .01 -.05 -.11** 
3 
5. Proportion of TMT from powerful regions 2 
6. CEO from prestgious universities .39 .49 .01 -.02 .03 .57*** -.04 5 
7. CEO from pow& regions .27 .60 .09* .07+ .OO -.04 .75***-.04 S 
8. Strategic industries .31 .46 -.08* -.13** -.12** -.01 .08+ -.01 .08* &+ 09 
9. Group affiliation (50) .30 .46 -.04 -.01 .20*** .20*** -.08+ .13*** -.04 .04 9 
10. Advertismg intensity 1.38 2.37 .07 -.09* .lo* .04 -.09* -.02 -.05 -.04 -.01 
1 1. R&D intensity 2.35 6.06 -.01 -.06 .05 .08* .OO .12** .01 .OO .16*** .04 
1) N=279 and 583 for 1986 and 1996, respective@; + p<. 10; * p<.05; ** p.01; *** p<.001. cn 
W 
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TABLE 2.3 Results of Regression Analysis On Profitability for Strategic 
Industq profitability 
Internal hining 
TMT kom prest@ous universities 
TMT from powerful regions 
CEO from prestigious universities 
CEO from powerful regions 
Shtegic industries 
Group a t i o n  (50) 
Advertising intensity 
R&D intensity 
R2 (Adjusted R2) 
Choices 
a) Standard errors are in parentheses under coefficients; + p<.10; * pc.05; ** 
pc.01; *** pc.001. 
Variables 
Contrary to expectations, however, the two TMT profile variables, 
i.e., 'proportion of TMT from prestigious universities' and  
'proportion of TMT from powerful regions' were not associated 
with profitability in 1986. The variable, 'group affiliation,' was 
highly correlated with profitability, but as  opposed to what was 
predicted, the correlation was negative. In general, results in 
Table 2, representing the correlations among variables for the 
1996 sample, do not support our expectations. On the contrary, 
' in terna l  t ra in ing , '  'proport ion of TMT from prest igious 
universities,' 'proportion of TMT from powerful region,' and 'CEO 
from powerful region' were more positively associated with firm 
profitability in 1996 than in 1986. More specific relationships 
Model 1: CEO 
1986 1996 
Model 2: W 
1986 1996 
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among variables can be examined in Table 3 that presents the 
results of regression analysis for both 1986 and 1996 samples. 
As a unit of analysis for top managers, we used CEO in model 
1 and TMT in model 2. As expected (Hypothesis l), model 1 
shows tha t  internal training was positively related to firm 
profitability in 1986, although the relationship was marginally 
significant (p < . lo ) .  While we expected the positive effect of 
internal training on profitability would disappear in  1996, 
however, it was still positive and statistically significant in 1996 
(p < .05). As hypothesized (Hypothesis 2.2), the effect of CEO 
from powerful regions on profitability was statistically significant 
and positive (p < .05) in 1986. Counter to expectations, however, 
the relationship was still positive and significant even in 1996 (p 
< .05). As expected in  Hypothesis 3 ,  the variable, 'strategic 
industries, '  was positively and significantly related to firm 
profitability in 1986 (p < .01), but, a s  expected, the relationship 
disappeared in 1996. The results in  model 1 also partially 
supported Hypothesis 5. That is, whereas advertising intensity 
was not related to firm profitability in 1986, it was positively and 
significantly related to firm profitability in 1996 (p < .05). As 
expected in Hypothesis 5, R&D intensity was not related to 
profitability i n  1986.  However, t h e  relat ionship was  no t  
significant in 1996 either. 
Although not reported due  to a space constraint,  'group 
affiliation' was  related nei ther  to 'CEO from prestigious 
universities' nor to 'strategic industries,' whereas it was highly 
related to 'TMT from prestigious universities' in 1986 and 1996 
( p  < .001) .  As will be  d i scussed ,  'TMT from prest igious 
universities' was not related to firm profitability in 1986, but  
significantly related in 1996 (p < .01). Therefore, the indirect 
effects of group affiliation on profitability were significant and 
positive only i n  1996  t h r o u g h  'TMT from pres t ig ious  
universities.' 
The coefficient of the variable, 'group affiliation,' in model 1 of 
Table 3,  which represents the direct effect of group affiliation on 
firm profitability, was statistically significant (p < .05) in 1986. 
Contrary to what was earlier predicted, however, the coefficient 
was negative, not positive, in 1986, indicating that the direct 
effect of group affiliation on performance was negative in 1986. 
The relationship, however, disappeared in 1996. 
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In model 2, we replaced the CEO variables in model 1 with the 
TMT variables (i.e., TMT from prestigious universities and TMT 
from powerful regions). Model 2 presents that although the both 
TMT variables were not related to profitability in 1986, they were 
significantly related in 1996. The results in model 2 imply that 
TMT became more powerful in  predicting organizational 
outcomes in 1996 than in 1986. In fact, the explanatory power 
of TMT was higher than that of CEO in 1996 (R2 of model 1 for 
1996 = .089; R2 of model 2 for 1996 = .098). The implications of 
this finding will be discussed below in detail. 
DISCUSSION AND IMPLICATIONS 
This article has provided evidence that prior to the late 1980s, 
on the one hand, most strategies for building such traditional 
and general R&Cs as  financial resources, managerial resources, 
government support, and capabilities to secure those resources 
were highly effective. On the other hand, strategies for building 
more industry-specific R&Cs, s u c h  as technologies a n d  
marketing capabilities, were not effective. This article also 
anticipated that due to the changes in the institutional context, 
strategies for developing the general R&Cs are not successful 
after the mid-1990s whereas strategies for developing the 
industry-specific R&Cs are. Contrary to what was expected, 
however, the results of this article showed that strategies for 
both the general R&Cs and the industry-specific R&Cs were 
effective after the mid- 1990s. These results indicate that despite 
significant changes, the  government is  still powerful and  
financial and labor markets are still inefficient, thus making 
traditional strategies for securing the general R&Cs still effective 
and successful even after the mid-1990s. At the same time, as 
the Korean further develops and as Korean firms face much 
more severe global competition, Korean firms are now required 
to compete based on the quality, not the quantity, of their 
products. In order to compete on quality, Korean firms need to 
secure highly sophisticated and advanced industry-specific 
R&Cs that are not only critical, but  also difficult to develop 
internally or to purchase from markets. Therefore, strategic 
challenges facing Korean firms are  twofold, building both 
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conventional and general R&Cs and more industry-specific 
R&Cs. 
Another interesting result of this article is the negative effect of 
group affiliation on performance in the old context. Several 
explanations for this unexpected result are possible. In the past, 
first, Korean firms competed for the size or market share, not 
profitability. The appropriate measure for performance should 
be the market share, not profitability. Second, group affiliation 
was predicted to be beneficial since it enables firms to recruit 
the best people and thus to develop strong managerial resources 
in the firm. As presented in the results section, the variable, 
'group affiliation,' was highly related to 'TMT from prestigious 
universities' (p < .001 for both 1986 and 1996 samples). 
However, TMT was not powerful enough to influence 
organizational outcomes as CEO, particularly prior to the late 
1980s (models 1 & 2 for 1986 in Table 3). Therefore, group 
affiliation was not indirectly related through 'TMT from 
prestigious universities' to performance in 1986. 
This article also expected that if a firm purposely diversified 
into strategic industries to achieve government support and 
financial resources and thus became a diversified group, group 
affiliation might be beneficial. The result indicates that the 
variable, 'group affiliation,' was not related to the variable, 
'strategic industries.' That is, the diversification strategy 
pursued by most Korean firms was not designed to secure 
government support and financial resources by diversifying into 
strategic industries. 
This article also shows that TMT was not so powerful in 
predicting organizational outcomes in 1986 whereas it is highly 
powerful in 1996. The upper echelons theory (Hambrick & 
Mason, 1984) suggested that study of TMT, rather than CEO, 
increases the potential strength of the theory to predict since 
CEO shares tasks and, to some extent, power with other team 
members. However, the explanatory power of TMT, or the degree 
to which CEO shares tasks and power with other TMT members, 
may differ by the institutional context which again varies 
through time and cross sectionally in different economies. 
Further research is needed to examine the relevance of the 
upper echelons theory in different economies and in difference 
time periods of study. 
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APPENDIX A FIVE-YEAR ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 
PLANS: 1962-1991 
R?al Export 
GNP growth Main goals and objectives 
growth 
First Plan Target 7.1 28.0 Development of energy, Mi-astructure, 
(1962-66) and import substitution industries 
Actual 7.8 36.8 (fertilizer, food processing, oil refining,; 
farm productivity increase; heavy foreign 
borrowing. 
Secondplan Target 7.0 17.1 Emphasis on export growth with 
(1967-71) incentives to promote labour-intensive 
Actual 9.7 33.8 industries (textile and cloth@. 
Third Plan Target 8.6 22.7 Continued export promotion; energy 
(1972-76) independence; agricultural self- 
Actual 10.1 32.7 sufficiency; establishment of general 
tradmg companies. 
Fourthplan Target 9.2 16.0 Emphasis on chemicals and heavy 
(1977-81) industry; develop technological skills; 
Actual 5.5 10.5 heavy fore@ borrowing. 
Fifth Plan Target 
(1982-86) 
Actual 
Sixth Plan Target 
(1987-91) 
Actual 
7.6 11.4 Stabilization, reduction of inflation, and 
liberalization of imports and financial 
9.0 9.7 markets; meet basic needs of people; 
develop skil-intensive industries; reduce 
reliance on foreign borrowing. 
7.3 10.1 Stabilization, shift out of declining 
industries, industrial reorganization away 
9.98 11.0 from big-business groups and towards 
small- and medium-sized firms, balanced 
trade with major partners. 
Source: Economic Planning Board 
